PGMAP: a privacy guaranteed mutual authentication protocol conforming to EPC class 1 gen 2 standards by Ye, T et al.
Title PGMAP: a privacy guaranteed mutual authentication protocolconforming to EPC class 1 gen 2 standards
Author(s) Wang, J; Wong, EC; Ye, T
Citation
The IEEE International Conference on e-Business Engineering
(ICEBE 2008), Xi'an, China, 22-24 October 2008. In Proceedings
of ICEBE, 2008, p. 289-296
Issued Date 2008
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/130948
Rights IEEE International Conference on e-Business Engineering.Copyright © IEEE.
 PGMAP: A Privacy Guaranteed Mutual Authentication Protocol 
Conforming to EPC Class 1 Gen 2 Standards  
 
 
Jiahao Wang1, 2,  Edward C. Wong2,  Terry Ye3,   
1School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology 
of China, China, wangjh@uestc.edu.cn 
2E-Business Technology Institute, the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
3Hong Kong R&D Centre for Logistics and Supply Chain Management Enabling Technologies, 
Hong Kong 
 
 
                                                           
  This research was supported by LSCM R&D Funding Program under Grant No. ITP/028/07LP 
Abstract 
 
To resolve the security vulnerabilities and comply 
with EPC Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID (EPC C1G2) 
Standard at the same time, we present a Privacy 
Guaranteed Mutual Authentication Protocol 
(PGMAP). By utilizing the existing functions and 
memory bank of tag, we amend the processing 
sequence based on current EPC architecture. An auto-
updating index number IDS is enrolled to provide 
privacy protection to EPC code and a set of light 
weight algorithms utilizing tag’s PRNG are added for 
authentication. Several attacks to the existing security 
solutions can be effectively resolved in our protocol. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With the booming prosperous of logistics and e-
business market, Radio frequency Identification (RFID) 
technology is showing more and more importance. As 
the price of RFID tag is already quite cheap now, a 
standard EPC Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID tag be between 
0.05and 0.1 € to be considered affordable[1]. The 
efficiency gains from using RFID tags could 
substantially lower the cost of tagged items, which 
enable RFID techniques can be widely applied. The 
benefit of this technique is obviously. But the low cost 
demand for a RFID tag also restricts its calculation and 
storage capability, which lead to weakness in some 
aspects, such as security. In contrast to established HF 
RFID standards like ISO 14443 and ISO 15693 where 
security protocols have already been deployed, the 
widely applied EPC C1G2 tag only provides an Access 
and a Kill password, APwd and KPwd, to protect the 
information stored in tags. A powerful malicious reader 
can easily snoop, corrupt or manipulate upon the tags if 
within acceptable communication range (up to 10 
meters for EPC C1G2). Similarly, tracking of people 
would also become possible. These potential risks scare 
away potential adoption as was the case with the 
boycott of Benetton where the garment maker was 
forced to take off RFID tags from their clothes. And a 
scan of tags attached on products inside a container, 
warehouse, etc, may also lead to corporate espionage. 
In the medical systems, any snoop and temper of the 
medical card information can cause even more serious 
problem.  
Although research literatures in RFID security 
already quite extensive and growing, most of them can 
not be easily applied into off-the-shelf tags. Among 
these researches, authentication and privacy are the 
major focus in security aspect. Some current RFID tags 
employ cryptographic primitives, but they tend to be 
more expensive than EPC tags. And the Auto-ID Lab, 
the research arm of EPCglobal, also operates a special 
interest group try to proposed uses of EPC to combat 
counterfeiting of consumer items [2]. They review 
extensions to existing EPC architecture for security 
applications.  
In this article, we propose a PGMAP to increase tag 
privacy protection and authentication functions while 
remain complying with the current EPC C1G2 Standard 
architecture. Based on utilizing the already been 
computation unit and memory storage in EPC tag, we 
try to implement security functions to the current 
scheme while minimize the amendments to tag’s 
hardware. This reservation is important to guarantee our 
improvement can be easily applied into real 
environment applications. An index-pseudonym IDS is 
used to replace EPC code during inventory process to 
prove privacy protection. And a set of light weight 
symmetric encryption algorithms are implemented for 
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Tag-Reader Mutual authentication. Several 
amendments are made to prevent Full Disclosure attack 
and De-synchronization attack introduced in previous 
work[3]. To implement these functions, processing 
sequence must consequently be changed. Our 
researched protocol is aimed to be an alternative to the 
creation of Class 2 EPC standard or as its basis. 
Organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 
II, a literature review is provided. The security threats 
of EPC C1G2 are reviewed in Section III. In section IV, 
theory and steps of PGMAP is introduced. Section V 
particularly analyzes the security attributes of our 
proposal. And section VI analysis implementation 
characters. Section VII will conclude this paper.  
2. Related work  
 
To the weakness on security of EPC C1G2 standard, 
a lot of researches have been carried out in the past 
several years.  
2.1. Literature review 
As in this heading, they should be Times 11-point 
boldface, initially capitalized, flush left, with one blank 
line before, and one after. 
In 2005, the Version 1.1.0 of EPC C1G2 standard 
was ratified both by EPCglobal and ISO, which 
harmonized the last version with the ISO 18000-6 Type 
C amendment[4]. In contrast to established HF RFID 
standards like ISO 14443 and ISO 15693 where 
security protocols have already been deployed, the 
widely applied EPC C1G2 tag only provides an Access 
and a Kill password (APwd and KPwd) to protect 
information stored in tags. And as the EPC C1G2 tags 
can practice outstanding far-field performance, with a 
communication range of up to 10 meters, it is not 
difficult to perform a Man-in-the-middle attack from 
powerful malicious readers. Some researches try to 
employ primitive cryptographic into RFID tags, 
including hash, symmetric or asymmetric based 
encryption algorithms. But these tags tend to be more 
expensive than EPC tags currently, and can only 
suitable for niche and high value product applications. 
As [5] summarized, Privacy and security in RFID 
can be protected through some physical approaches, 
including simple RF shielding (e.g., aluminum foil), 
distance detection, interference with RFID singulation 
and physical disablement.   
In the symmetric encryption scope, researchs 
mainly concentrate in developing cryptography 
potentially lightweight enough for inclusion in low-cost 
devices. A standard implementation of the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES), 20-30K gates are 
considered to be applicable in some kind of passive 
tags[1]. Feldhofer et al. have described an AES 
implementation designed specifically for RFID 
devices[6]. This implementation requires security 
resources exceeding those presently possible in EPC 
tags, but perhaps suitable for some of the enhancements 
we describe here. It is as yet unclear whether any of 
these recently proposed primitives are both strong 
enough and agile enough for use in low-cost RFID tags, 
but they represent an important continuing area of 
inquiry.  
Most of the proposed solutions are based on the use 
of hash functions with a reduced number of gates, but 
although this proposal seems to be light enough to used 
in a low-cost RFID tag, the security of this hash scheme 
remains an open question. Even some prototype 
successfully taken used the traditional hash functions 
(MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2), the increased cost will out 
burden many applications in real environment[7]. Peris 
et al. introduced several topical hash based schemes, 
including hash lock, randomized hash lock and hash 
chain[8]. Articles [9, 10] improved them and provide 
binary tree based hash-chain. Hash based solutions can 
be used to solve the tracking and tracing problems in 
RFID to protect the privacy of tag side.  But as these 
solutions still require extra hash function or memory 
storage, they still not suitable to be applied into the 
widely used EPC C1G2 tags.  
To investigate the extremely lightweight security 
protocols, article [11] summarized a set of  XOR based 
authentication protocols. In [12], Juels proposes a 
solution based on the use of pseudonyms, without using 
any hash function. LMAP and M2AP provide two light 
weight protocols based on the use of pseudonyms and 
XOR operations[1, 13]. The index-pseudonym refers to 
a table in which all the information about a tag is stored. 
Each tag has an associated key which be divided into 
four 96 bits parts. But these schemes are not 
sophisticated enough, Li and Wang analyzed some 
weakness of LMAP and M2AP and try to break them 
through two active attacks[3]. The first one is named 
De-synchronization attack which can break the 
communication between the tag and the reader. The 
second is a man-in-the-middle attack called Full-
disclosure attack, which can get the whole secret key of 
the tag. They give out solutions with 40% increase 
consumption of tag’s memory, but which can very 
likely lead to DOS attack to tags. Article [13] also give 
out an extension version LMAP+ to countermeasure the 
weaknesses. But unfortunately, the problems are not 
well solved as they announced. By calculating the least 
significant bits of every key and secret,  Mihaly etc 
show that LMAP can be easily broken through a few 
rounds of eavesdropping[14]. From application 
perspective, article [15] provides another light weight 
tag-reader mutual authentication scheme complying to 
EPC standards. However, this paper doesn’t consider 
privacy and vulnerability under the above attacks.  
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In 2007, Chien et al. try to solve the mutual 
authentication problem through taking use of the tag’s 
Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) function[16]. But such 
CRC solutions were proved by Pedro et al. few months 
later that they are not suitable for solving the existing 
problems[17]. 
2.2. Our innovation 
The research literature in RFID security is already 
quite extensive and growing. Based on utilizing existing 
calculation capability and memory of EPC tag, we 
focus on protocols to realize privacy protection and 
mutual authentication on the off-the-shelf products. We 
consider ways to create RFID tags that perform 
cryptographic functionality while remaining compliant 
with both the EPC C1G2 standard and conformance 
specification.  
To sum up, the main contributions of this paper are 
as follows. (1) In this work, we design a standard 
compliant protocol to minimize amendments to 
hardware architecture of tag. This compatibility is 
important to guarantee our innovation can be easily 
applied. (2) A set of light weight symmetric encryption 
algorithms is implement which take use existing 
functions in EPC tag, such as 16 bits Pseudo-Random 
Number Generator (PRNG), bitwise XOR (⊕), bitwise 
OR (∨), bitwise AND (∧), addition mod 2m (+), APwd 
and KPwd, et al. (3) Index-pseudonym (IDS) is used to 
replace EPC code during inventory process to prove 
privacy protection. (4) Mutual authentication function 
added based on EPC architecture. (5) Several 
amendments are made to prevent Full Disclosure attack 
and De-synchronization attack in previous works.  
No cryptographic hash functions/keys are used 
within tags our protocol. And different with the former 
research, we contribute to the state of arts of researches 
on solving security weakness in light weight 
encryptions by taking use of EPC tag’s PRNG. 
Meanwhile, we try our best on optimization to reduce 
costs and design complexity. Our solution is more 
efficiency and applicable to the widely used EPC tag. 
3. EPC Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID 
Protocol[4]  
 
The EPC C1G2 standard can be considered as 
specification for low-cost RFID tags on off-the-shelf 
applications. Although it represents a great advance for 
the establishing of RFID technology, the security level 
of this standard is extremely low. To facilitate the 
description, table 1 list the notations we used in this 
paper. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Security of EPC Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID Protocol 
READER TAG
Step1: Interrogator issuses a Query, 
QueryAdjust, or QueryRep
Query/Adjust/Rep
{PC, EPC
}
Req_RN(RInventory )
Rhandle
Step 5: Interrogator issues Req_RN 
containing same RInventory 
Step2: Two possible outcomes
If Slot=0: Tag responds with  RInventory ;
If Slot<>0: No reply RInve
ntory  
Step 3: Interrogator acknowledges 
Tag by issuing ACK with same RInventory 
Step 4: Two possible outcomes:
    If Valid RInventory :responds with {PC, EPC};
    Else: No reply
ACK( RInventory )
Step 6: Two possible outcomes:
    If Valid RInventory : responds with Rhandle
    Else: No replyStep 7: Interrogator accesses Tag.
  Each access command uses Rhandle 
as a parameter
Req_RN(Rhandle)
Step 9: Interrogator send 
    CCPwdM = APwdM   RT1 Step 10: Tag verifies CCPwdM
    If   APwdM == (CCPwdM     RT1):
 responds with RT2;
    Else: No reply
RT1
CCPwdM & Req_RN(handle )
RT2
Req_RN(handle )
Step 8: Two possible outcomes:
    If Valid Rhandle: responds with RT1;
    Else: No reply
Step 11: Interrogator send 
    CCPwdL = APwdL    RT2
Step 12: Tag verifies CCPwdL
    If   APwdL == (CCPwdL     RT2):
 Interrogator Authentic;
    Else: End Communication 
⊕
⊕
⊕
⊕
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Table 1. Notations 
Notation Descriptions 
RInventory 16bit Random No. used for singulate a tag 
Rhandle 16bit Random No. used for represent a tag 
RT 16bit Random No. Generated by Tag 
RI 16bit Random No. Generated by Reader  
IDS 16bit Index Pseudonym Random No.  
APwdM 16 MSBs of APwd 
APwdL 16 LSBs of  APwd 
n The serial number of current round 
|| Concatenates its right operand to the 
end of its left operand 
⊕ Bitwise XOR operation 
∨ Bitwise OR operation 
∧ Bitwise AND operation 
 
3.1. Security Assessment of EPC Class1 Gen2 
UHF RFID Protocol 
From the view of security, the processing sequence 
of EPC C1G2 protocol mainly including two functions, 
inventory and access, as divided by the dashed line in 
the figure 1. 
 A tag will generate 4 random numbers in the 
process. The use of Kill password is similar as the 
above sequences. To guarantee the obscure efficiency, 
the protocol request a reader shall not use handle or 
reuse a random number for cover-coding purposes.  
From the view of security aspect, the EPC C1G2 
tags only support on-chip a 16 bits PRNG , a 16 bits 
CRC, two 32 bits APwd and KPwd. Besides, the 
reserved memory can be locked by the manufacturer, to 
prevent unauthorized read or modification. But tag 
memory is still susceptible to physical attacks.  
3.2. Security treats and requirements 
The EPC C1G2 standard can be considered as 
specification for low-cost RFID tags on off-the-shelf 
applications. Even this standard already be considered a 
great success after having been adopted by many RFID 
manufacturers, the quite simple security mechanism of 
EPC C1G2 constitutes an important pitfall.  Except the 
problems mentioned in the former research, there are 
three major threats we try to resolve in this work.  
Threat 1: Trace and Tracking: The tag’s privacy is 
not considered in Class 1 Gen 2 standard, which can 
cause seriously problem to customers. As the RF signal 
usually transmit through open air media, and up to 10 
meters for EPC C1G2 tag, it will be easy for an attacker 
to obtain the EPC code of a tag by simply eavesdrops 
the air channel. Shield external RF signals/noise 
physically (i.e. Faraday cage) is not applicable in many 
real application environments.  
Threat 2: Malicious RFID Readers: Products labeled 
with tags reveal sensitive information when queried by 
readers, and they do it indiscriminately. Therefore, a 
powerful malicious reader can illegally snoop, corrupt 
or manipulate upon tags. For instance, a disgruntled or 
compromised employee with such readers can simply 
initiate Man-in-the-Middle Attack to eavesdrop and 
impersonate those random numbers and one-time-pads 
in the communication processing. Then, the attacker 
will be able to decode the cipher texts from the reader 
by performing the same operations as the tag. 
Threat 3: RFID Tag Cloning: The EPC C1G2 
standard provide solutions for tag to authenticate 
readers by examining the shared passwords between 
them. But there is no authentication to the tag from the 
reader side. This concision for the protocol leaves 
drawbacks in application. Any people know the data 
(e.g., EPC number) structure can probably generate 
fake tags and attached to counterfeit products. This 
threat can only be resolved through authentication 
methods. Even tags giving out genuine EPC numbers, 
they must still be authenticated by the reader. 
For the above reasons, tag’s PIN or EPC code mast 
be masked and transmitted through secure channel to 
solve the security problems. Meanwhile, cover code 
should be transferred through a secure way for obscure 
the password during communication.   
4. Scheme of PGMAP 
 
To resolve the security weakness in EPC C1G2, the 
standard leave rooms to strengthen for optional 
commands or class 2 tag. Here based on our prior work 
[7], we propose a new PGMAP utilizing the already 
been capabilities on EPC C1G2 tag.  
We assume that both the backward and the forward 
channels can be eavesdropped by an attacker, despite 
their asymmetry. Some light weight encryption 
processes are added to tag. And the whole processing 
sequence can be split into three main stages, named 
inventory phases, mutual authentication phases and 
updating phases. Figure 2 particularly describes the 
processing sequences.  
(1) Inventory phases 
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Steps 1-5 details tag inventory process. Among 
which, steps 1-3 are exactly same as EPC C1G2 scheme. 
The communication must be initiated by readers due to 
the fact that low cost tags are passive. If the query 
received by a Tag within right slot, it will generate a 16 
bits random number RInventory through its PRNG and 
reply to the reader. Then, the RInventory be used in ACK 
by the reader. After receive corresponding ACK in step 
4, the selected tag will send its IDST(n) to the reader 
instead of PC or EPC code. The index-pseudonym IDS 
is the index of a table (a row) where all the information 
about a tag is stored.  We use IDST(n) and IDSI(n) 
represent the index send from  tag and reader 
respectively. They may be de-synchronized under 
attack and they are updated after each successive 
conversation to guarantee tag’s privacy.  
In step 5, reader will scan index rows IDSI(n) and 
IDSI(n-1) from database for corresponding IDST(n). 
Normally, a record including all the necessary 
information about the tag can be found. The record 
items including {IDS(n), IDS(n+1), RT(n), RI(n), 
[Ki(n)](i∈[1,4])}. At the reader side, the keys need to be 
setup at step 5 in each conversation. Similar to LMAP, 
we take use the following algorithms for key updating:  
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
1 1 3( )
n n n n
TK K R K ID
− − −
= ⊕ ⊕ +      (1) 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
2 2 4( )
n n n n
TK K R K ID
− − −
= ⊕ ⊕ +      (2) 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
3 3 1( ) ( )
n n n n
IK K R K ID
− − −
= ⊕ + ⊕      (3) 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
4 4 2( ) ( )
n n n n
IK K R K ID
− − −
= ⊕ + ⊕      (4) 
Figure 2. Proposed Privacy Guaranteed Mutual Authentication Protocol  
READER TAG
Step1: Interrogator issuses a Query, 
QueryAdjust, or QueryRep
Step 1 : Query/Adjust/Rep
Step 4:
 {IDST
(n) }
Step 6: A||B
N: The reader is invalid
( )
1 1
( )
2 2
n
I
n
I
F A K IDS R
F B IDS K R
= ⊕ ⊕ =
= ⊕ ⊕ =( ) ( ) ( )3
n n n
TC IDS K R⊕ ⊕ =
Step 7:
  C|| D
Step 6.2: Reader Authentication Process
Step 7.2: Tag Authentication Process
Step 7.3: Find ID and verify
( ) ( )
( )
1:
 Tag Authenticated
case2: 
 Reader Authentication Failed
case3: 
 The Tag is invalid
n n
I T
n
T
case R R
R
others
⊕
Step 8: DB Updating
Step 10: Gendrate E
Step 11: Update Tag
  Verify If  IDSI (n+1) == IDST (n+1)
     Y: Update tag
      write  IDS(n+1)  , [Ki(n+1)](             ) to EEPROM; 
     N: De-synchronized
      Quit;
Step 5: Tag Identification Process
Step 2: Verify if Slot==0
     Y: Tag responds with  RInventory
     N: No reply
Step 7.1: Tag Authentication Process
Generate RT(n) from PRNG, C, D 
Step 9: Index-Pseudonym and Key Updating 
Step 2:
  RInvento
ry
Step 3: Interrogator acknowledges Tag by 
issuing ACK with same  RInventory
Step 4: Verify if Valid  RInven1tory
      Y: responds with {IDS(n)}
      N: No reply
Step 3 : ACK( RInventory)
Step 6.1: Reader Authentication Process
        Generate RI(n), A, B
(Prevent Full Disclosure Attack)
  (Prevent De-synchronization attack)
If IDSI(n) ==IDST(n)
( 1)
(n) (n) (n) (n)
I i T I
(n+1)
I
 
Record {IDS , [K ](i [1,4]), R , R ,
 IDS } to DB
n
IUpdate IDS
+
∈
If IDSI(n-1) ==IDST(n)
( ) ( 1) , ( [1,4])n ni iK K i
−
= ∈
IDSI(n) =IDSI(n-1)
If IDST(n) can not find 
    unknown Tag
Step 10: E
Step 6.3: Verify if F1==F2
     Y: Reader Authenticated
( )( )nD IDS ID⊕ +
Update IDST(n+1), K(n+1)
Updating K(n)
(D' if the reader invalid)
i [1,4]∈
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If no IDSI(n) match and a IDSI(n-1) be found, that 
means something wrong in the last conversation round 
during updating phases and caused a de-
synchronization between the reader and the tag. In this 
situation, we simply reuse the keys in last version to 
resynchronize the record in both sides. And further than 
just defend De-synchronization attack, we can also 
defend DOS attacks, which may aimed on disable tags 
and remain unsolved on the previous works. The 
security evaluation will be given out in the next section.  
(2) Mutual authentication phases 
Steps 6-7 details Mutual Authentication process.  
The authentication function is composed by two 
message exchanging processes. After keys setup, step 6 
details tag authentication process which includes 3 parts. 
In step 6.1, reader generate a new random numbers RI(n). 
Accompanied with K1(n) and K2(n), it is used to generate 
messages A and B as: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
n n n
IA IDS K R= ⊕ ⊕    (5) 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
n n n
IB IDS K R= ∨ +    (6) 
Then, they are combined as the signature of the 
reader, A||B, and send to tag. If they possessing the 
same K1(n) and K2(n), RI(n) can be distilled by reverse 
computation in tag and the reader can be authorized. 
In step 7.1, a RT(n) is generated through tag’s PRNG 
and used in messages C and D (D′ if reader is invalid). 
As these calculations are carried out on the tag, we 
utilize the already been calculating units in the tag. The 
encryption functions are as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
3
n n n
TC IDS K R= + +    (7) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )n n nT ID IDS ID R R= + ⊕ ⊕    (8) 
( ) ( )' ( )n nTD IDS ID R= + ⊕     (9) 
After reader receive C||D, it firstly distills RT(n) from 
C at step 7.2. Thereafter, it checks the validity of the tag 
by calculates ( )( )nD IDS ID⊕ + . Upon failure, the reader 
will initiate a re-authenticated process and the record of 
retry times shall be increase 1 for the tag. This record is 
used for defend brute force attack. A tag will be 
temporarily or permanently forbidden if its retry times 
exceed certain threshold.  
(3) Updating phases  
After the reader and the tag have been mutually 
authenticated, the IDS and keys updating processes are 
carried out in a secure form in steps 8-11 for protecting 
the tag’s privacy. The random numbers RI(n) and RT(n) 
will be used again to prevent Full Disclosure Attack. 
The different is, only IDSI(n+1)  updated on reader side. 
And the reader will store all the parameters at current 
conversation to database, including IDSI(n+1), IDS(n), 
RT(n), RI(n) and [Ki(n)](i∈[1,4]). And the updating 
calculations of keys are leaved to the next conversation. 
The updating process of IDS is as: 
( 1) ( ) (n) ( )
T 4( (R ))
n n nIDS IDS K ID+ = + ⊕ ⊕  (10) 
And it is embedded in message E to send to tag as 
updating notice.  
( 1) (n) (n)
T I( ) R R
n
IE IDS ID
+
= + ⊕ ⊕   (11) 
To the tag side, after send out he authentication 
signature C||D at step 7, it directly start calculate the 
updating messages in step 9, including IDST(n+1) and 
[Ki(n+1)](i∈[1,4]). To update it immediately is because a 
Class 1 tag only has restricted computation capability 
and powered by backscattering energy sent by the 
reader device. All the time consuming calculation must 
be accomplished before it lose power supply from the 
reader. The updating algorithms are same as those in 
reader side. Those updated IDS(n+1) and 
[Ki(n+1)](i∈[1,4]) will be write to tag’s EEPROM if 
IDSI(n+1) equal to  IDST(n+1). Otherwise, the tag will 
cease updating to prevent DOS attack.   
5. Security analysis  
 
To protect the privacy of a tag, our protocol 
involves a tag identity updating phases after each 
successful conversation. Unlike those hash and 
asymmetric key based solutions, our protocol 
implements an extremely light weight scheme based 
only on bitwise XOR (⊕), bitwise OR (∨), bitwise 
AND (∧), and addition mod 2m (+) operations. Our 
protocol also takes use of the index-pseudonym (IDS) 
to prove privacy protection. The IDS index a record 
storing four associated keys, K1, K2, K3 and K4. All 
these parameters are with the length of 16 bits to 
accompany EPC C1G2 standard. By implementing 
these functions, we can at least solve the following 
problems in the current system.  
(1) Privacy:  
In addition to the original standard, we increase the 
privacy protection at the very beginning of each 
communication sessions. Instead of sending its ID 
through open channel, a tag will answer reader’s query 
by replying its current IDS(n), thus an eavesdropper can 
only get random wraps in this process. The real tag ID 
is sent through the encrypted message D in the 
following conversation. To prevent the possible 
violation of the location privacy of a tag owner, IDS(n) 
will be updated after each successful communication 
session with a valid reader by calculating IDS(n+1) 
separately in both side. Further more, by update the 
IDS(n) and the 4 keys after the mutual authentication, a 
future security compromise on an RFID tag will not 
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reveal data previously transmitted and forward security 
can be guaranteed. 
(2) Mutual Authentication:  
For authenticating the reader to the tag, a validate 
reader mast have the proper privilege to access the 
database and distill its current 4 keys Ki (n) (i∈[1,4]). By 
enrolling mutual authentication and encryption 
functions to the EPC standard, we can fend off many 
threats like exposed tag’s passwords, malicious 
snooping readers, disgruntled employee, Cloned Tag, 
man-in-the-middle attacks, et al. 
(3) Prevent De-synchronization Attack: 
 As described in article [3], an active attacker can 
initiate a man-in-the-middle attack at first. Then, he or 
she pick a bit from the same position of messages A to 
D and perform ⊕ operation to change the random 
numbers RI or RT during the authentication or updating 
process. According to the equations from A to D, both 
sides may have certain possibility to accept the 
amended numbers. For example, RT is generated by 
tag’s PRNG, reader side may be fraud if RT tempered. 
And it may finally influence the updating result E. as 
described in step 10 in figure 2. RI and RT must be 
successfully fraud on the same time before the final 
updating message E can be accept be the tag. Different 
from former work, our solution implement mutual 
authentication. Successful attack can also influence the 
storage in reader side. Table 2 depicts the 
corresponding result after attacking different messages.  
Table 2. Updated storages after attack 
Attacks Reader storage Tag storage Success 
A, B 1 2 3 4[IDS, K ,K ,K ,K ,]  1 2 3 4[IDS, K ,K ,K ',K ',] 50%
C, D 1 2 3 4[IDS', K ',K ',K ,K ,]  1 2 3 4[IDS, K ,K ,K ,K ,] 50%
A,B,C 1 2 3 4[IDS', K ',K ',K ,K ,]  1 2 3 4[IDS, K ,K ,K ',K ',] 25%
Different from former work, successful attack can 
also influence the storage of reader or DB record in our 
protocol. To solve the problem, article [3] try to storing 
status information in tag’s memory.  Although they can 
prevent the multiple trials from attacker and distinguish 
abnormal tag, an attacker still has high probability to 
cause DOS attack to prevent the tag from successive 
update. To increase the robustness of the entire system, 
storing all the necessary information at the database 
side still should be the best solution. And a tag’s 
availability can be discerned by recording its retry times 
at server side.  
The keys values are depend on which IDS can be 
found in step 5. By doing so, even the corresponding 
tag did not update its IDS and keys in last round, it still 
can be identified in the next round. The failure of 
updating may either caused by unmatched IDST and 
IDSI in step 11 or by losing power. Then, we can 
prevent the De-synchronization attack in our protocol 
with no extra addition storage in EEPROM. 
(4) Prevent Full Disclosure Attack: 
Full disclosure attack is a simple but effective 
method to break the XOR based encryption methods, 
such as LMAP and M2AP. It is based on repeatedly run 
the incomplete protocol many times (96 trials in LMAP) 
at the tag side by changing the j-th bit of A and B 
respectively. By judging the response message received 
from tag, the full bit values of RI can be disclosed. After 
get RI, disclosing the rest parameter can be much easier.    
To counter this attack, we use the message pare C||D 
in step 7 to act as the replication from tag to reader. If 
the reader is successively authenticated, the reply will 
assigned D. otherwise, a failure notice message D′ will 
be generated to compose the reply. And because a 
random number RT is contained, which generated from 
the tag’s PRNG in each trial. The attacker can not get 
any clue on from the reply. The attacker can only wait 
the response of the reader to decide whether the change 
of the j-th bit is accepted. However, the repeating trials 
by the attacker can easily be identified and insulated by 
a stateful reader. Then, we can defend this attack 
through a simpler way. 
6. Implementation analysis 
 
Considering EPC C1G2 tags are very 
computationally constrained devices, we only take use 
of the existing functions in the tag. Here we only use 
bitwise XOR (⊕), bitwise OR (∨), bitwise AND (∧), 
and addiction mod 2m (+) in our protocol. As they have 
already been implemented in the existing EPC C1G2 
tags on off-the-shelf products, there will be no extra 
gate counting needed. To implement our protocol, we 
need to redesign the processing sequence on both the 
tag and the reader side. Totally 4 encryption and 
decryption algorithms and 5 updating algorithms need 
to be added into tag’s processing sequence.  
For the memory storage, we consider its use as an 
input/output medium capable of interfacing with a set 
of crypto operation within the tag. And we also try to 
take use of the existing memories of EPC C1G2 tag to 
avoid extra storage costs. Our solution utilizes the 
Reserved memory bank in EPC C1G2 tag where 
containing two 32 bits passwords, APwd and KPwd. 
The kill and access passwords are individually lockable, 
as EPC, TID, and User memory. The EPC, TID, and 
User memory banks are always readable regardless of 
their lock status. The reserved memory mast be 
read/write unlocked to provide updating capability in 
our protocol. Here we divide these memories into 4 
pairs, APwdM, APwdL, KPwdM and KPwdL, each 
represents a 16 bits password share and used as K1 to 
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K4 in our protocol. Different with LMAP and M2AP 
whose key’s length are 24 bits, our solution shorted the 
length of the keys to 16 bits to accompany with the half 
length of the passwords in EPC C1G2 standard. For the 
same reason, we also use the 16 bit PC from EPC 
memory to act as ID in our protocol. Shorter keys may 
decrease the crypto strength under brute force attack. 
Considering the cost of increasing hardware of tag, it is 
still a worthy trade-off between security and 
applicability. Our proposed scheme can still be 
applicable and more strengthened, if the length of 
APwd and KPwd be extended in active tags or 
enhanced tags used for high value items.  
Besides the existing storages, our protocols add a 16 
bits IDS. And four 16 bits keys, K1 to K4, are also 
added which need 64 bits at all. Totally, we need 
increase 80 bits rewritable memory storage space from 
User memory. EPC memory and TID memory are 
leaving unchanged, which still can be achieved after 
authentication. To facilitate authentication process, the 
length of IDS is set equal to the length of random 
number or half of password length.   
7. Conclusion 
 
Many former proposals are based on the hypothesis 
that low-cost tags can not generate random numbers, 
and they make almost all the computational load fall on 
the reader side. Based on the latest research 
achievements, we provide a PGMAP in this paper 
concerning security attributes of EPC C1G2 standard. 
We take advantage of the existing functions on the EPC 
C1G2 tag and used its PRNG. As the random numbers 
and keys are all 16 bits in our protocol, our protocol can 
be easily merged into the EPC C1G2 scheme. Our 
solution may be not fully secure but it is simple, cost-
effective, and light-weight to be implemented on tag. 
Through the three phases in our protocol, we can thwart 
many existing threats. Our improvements try to avoid 
extra hardware requirement in EPC C1G2 tag, which 
guarantee PGMAP can be easily applied to real 
application environments. Important related problems, 
such as implementation performance and security 
verification, will be addressed in future reports. 
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